The Battle of Poitiers 1356 Read online

  In contrast to the Crécy-Calais campaign there was only a small Welsh contingent in the prince’s army in 1355. These were attached to the prince’s own household retinue. Gronou ap Griffith commanded 60 men from north Wales, and David ap Blethin Vaghan, 30 men from Flintshire. Three notable Welsh knights also brought their retinues: John Griffith, Rhys ap Griffith, who may have been the leader of a force from south Wales, and Hywel ap Griffith, known to posterity as Sir Hywel of the Axe. This was the first campaign in the Hundred Years War in which the Welsh were recorded as using horses.3

  Wages of war and ‘regard’ (an advance payment) were received by the following:

  Prince of Wales:

  £8,129 18s.

  Earl of Warwick:

  £2,614 4s.

  Earl of Suffolk:

  £1,428 6s. 8d.

  Earl of Oxford:

  £1,174 13s. 10d.

  Earl of Salisbury:

  £1,124 2s. 2d.

  Reginald Cobham:

  £652 8d.

  As well as a considerable administrative and logistical exercise, this was a major financial undertaking. The advance cost of the expedition including war wages and payment of ‘regard’ totalled some £19,500, and shipping contributed a further £3,300. In the year from September 1355, over £55,000 was spent on the prince’s military operation in Gascony.4

  Although sent to Gascony to lead a military expedition the prince also had governmental, political and diplomatic responsibilities. Appointed his father’s lieutenant in the duchy, he was provided with financial resources ‘for the conciliation of the people of the country’ and authority to make ordinances and act ‘as he shall think best for the honour and profit of the king in all matters ... in the duchy of Gascony’. Furthermore, in the event of the prince being besieged or beset by overwhelming forces, reinforcements were to be sent by the king in person and/or the duke of Lancaster, and earls of Arundel, Northampton, March and Stafford. It was to be a national expedition, resourced by the crown and supported by the most powerful magnates of the realm, but the inherent dangers were also recognised and the potential threat of the loss or capture of the heir-apparent was given due consideration.

  Nonetheless, the force that left England in 1355 was small compared with those recruited in 1346 although it was complemented on arrival by Gascon forces and further increased prior to the 1356 expedition when Sir Richard Stafford, one of the prince’s key retainers, was commissioned to reinforce and re-supply the army.

  Evidence for the Gascon participants in 1355 and 1356 is also not as comprehensive as one would wish. Despite the abundance of records in Gascony for the period 1354–61, those detailing the 1355 campaign are not complete.5 It is clear, nonetheless, that several members of the local nobility led military companies and some had seen action in English service in the past. Despite the chequered nature of Gascon relations with the English crown over many years, the political and military integrity of the duchy depended, to a greater or lesser degree, on the support of the local aristocracy. In this context, even without any other motivation, the reason is clear for the success of the Gascon appeal to Edward III. The Captal de Buch, an established supporter of the English cause, was among those who asked for help in January 1355. To further strengthen his loyalty, Edward III granted him various rights and perquisites, mainly in the towns of Bénauges and Ilaz. In addition, members of the Albret family, Amauri de Biron, sire de Montferrand, Auger de Montaut, sire de Mussidan, Guillaume de Pommiers, Guillaume Sans, sire de Lesparre, and Guillaume Amanier, sire de Roson all led troops in the campaigns of 1355–6.

  The Commanders

  The chief commanders and officers of the 1355 expedition were closely associated with the prince’s household and personal retinue. Among the magnates, Robert Ufford, earl of Suffolk, the titular head of the prince’s council, had been associated with him since 1338, and William Montague, earl of Salisbury, had been knighted with the prince when they had landed at La Hogues on the Crécy campaign in 1346. In addition to Warwick, Lisle and Cobham, the leaders included James Audley, Richard Stafford, John Chandos, John Wingfield, Baldwin Botetourt, Bartholomew Burghersh, Nigel Loryng, Stephen Cosington, Roger Cotesford, Alan Cheyne and William Trussel. These were men of considerable military experience in the wars with France and Scotland, and several had fought in Gascony and understood its political character. Among these, Loryng, Audley and Stafford had served with Henry of Grosmont, then earl of Derby, in 1345.

  The military talent at the prince’s disposal can be seen in the fact that the army contained seven current knights of the Garter and two future members – Ufford and Cobham. Among the commanders at least a dozen had fought at Crécy. These bonds would be strengthened by a year’s campaigning, and its growing collective experience made the prince’s retinue an extremely effective military force.6

  In addition to the purely military arm of the prince’s entourage, much of his domestic household also rode with him, and their peacetime function was amended to incorporate campaigning duties both for the prince himself and the army at large. The prince’s household staff included Nicholas Bonde (squire), Henry Aldrington (master-tailor), William Bakton (yeoman of the buttery), Richard Doxeye (baker), Robert Egremont (pavillioner), Geoffrey Hamelyn (keeper of the prince’s armour), John Henxteworth (controller of the household), William Lenche (porter), and Henry Berkhamsted (porter, later constable of Berkhamsted castle). These men organised and administered the campaign and the prince valued their service highly: officers of the household received gifts worth a total of £275 10s. for their efforts in outfitting the expedition to Gascony.7

  The roles these men played in the daily organisation of the army and in its command structure can be reconstructed partially from evidence contained in a number of campaign letters. These were part of an ongoing propaganda campaign that appears to have been relatively successful in ensuring public support and, more importantly, public money for the war with France. These communications, sent back by Edward and others, indicate Audley, Chandos, Botetourt and at times Burghersh ‘were the prince’s handy men for field work, that Stafford was assigned to special tasks (as he had been before the campaign), that Wingfield remained as ‘head of the office’ and that these men who had of course known one another before going out to France, formed a group bound by friendly relations to one another and by common loyalty to their chief: they were part of the ‘permanent staff’.’8

  Preparation and Transport

  The indenture of 10 June 1355, in addition to outlining the troops to be recruited for the expedition, also detailed the means by which the army was to travel to Gascony and undertake the chevauchée once it arrived there. It included specifications for the purchase of horses, the provision of ships, and lesser matters such as the purveyance of hurdles (used for separating horses when onboard ship). Thomas Hoggeshawe, lieutenant of John Beauchamp, the admiral of the fleet west of the Thames, was appointed acting commander of the prince’s fleet, and John Deyncourt, sub-admiral of the northern fleet, was also involved. General orders regarding the impending expedition were sent out as early as April. Henry Keverell, presumably a merchant or supplier of ships and boats, was paid for the purchase of gear for the prince’s ship; items were delivered to John le Clerk and his fellows, the keepers of the Christophre, the ship on which the prince was to travel; and on 16 July, ships from Bayonne were impounded (or ‘arrested’ as it was described) in various ports.9 Some of these vessels had previously been used to transport Henry of Lancaster’s troops to Normandy where he was to be engaged in a campaign in the hope that a twin-pronged assault would divide French royal forces between the north and the south.10 Letters of safe conduct were issued to the prince’s men between 8 June and 6 September. Preparations were undertaken, it seems, with the intention that the expeditionary force should arrive in Gascony immediately after the expiration of the Anglo-French truce on 24 June. In the event, however, contrary winds and delays in securing sufficient numbers of ships pre
vented departure until the second week of September. During the delay at Plymouth the prince stayed at Plympton Priory and concerned himself with affairs concerning his duchy of Cornwall. Tiderick van Dale, usher of the prince’s chamber, and Bartholomew Burghersh, the younger, led an advance party prior to the arrival of the main fleet soon after 1 July, and Stephen Cosington and William the Chaplain prepared the archbishop’s palace at Bordeaux for the prince who stayed there, whilst not on campaign, until his return to England in 1357. The fleet sailed on 8 or 9 September and arrived in Bordeaux just over a week later at the height of the vendage. The earls of Warwick, Suffolk and their retinues embarked and sailed separately from Southampton.11

  On 21 September, the prince was presented to the great and the good of the duchy. He spoke before the nobles of Gascony and the citizens of Bordeaux; his appointment as the king’s lieutenant was proclaimed and his father’s letters and commands were read out in a ceremony conducted in considerable splendour in the cathedral of St Andrew.12

  Les cavaliers de l’Apocalypse13

  Following as it did on the heels of the Black Death, the chevauchée of 1355 was a catastrophe for the people of southern France. The raid from Bordeaux to Narbonne cemented the Black Prince’s reputation, and perhaps, consequently, his pseudonym: Louis of Anjou’s Apocalypse tapestries would depict a similar raid as demonic. The prince was to be only one of the horsemen, however. As had been the strategy in 1346, the campaign was preceded by an attempt to divide French forces. This, again, involved Henry of Grosmont; he attacked Normandy with Charles of Navarre, while the prince rode from Gascony. It is possible that there was a third element to the plan and that King Edward himself may have intended to lead a further expeditionary force into the French interior.

  No attempts at secrecy preceded the attack led by the prince in 1355. Hostilities had already broken out between Armagnac and the Gascons, and the raid from Bordeaux was merely one element in a wider operation; French forces would be divided if they tried to deal with the king, the prince and Lancaster simultaneously.

  The army left Bordeaux on or a little before 5 October. Its strength, augmented by the contingents led by the Gascon nobility, probably numbering a further 4,000 men, brought the total force to between 6,000 and 8,000 troops. It marched south and a little east before heading almost due east on reaching Plaissance. Thereafter the raid continued to the Mediterranean coast and Narbonne. The return to Bordeaux followed a not dissimilar path, widening the band of destruction to encompass Limoux, Boulbonne and Gimont. The raid proved to be a remarkable exercise in devastation and destruction, and was the pre-eminent example of the chevauchée strategy. The army travelled from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean and back. It targeted the economic resources and the political credibility of the Valois monarchy in the south through assaults on more than 500 villages, towns, castles and other settlements.

  When nearing Arouille, following usual practice, the army divided into three columns in order to march on a broad front to maximise any damage that might be caused. Anglo-Gascon casualties were low throughout the 1355 raid but there was a notable exception at this point in the operation when John Lord Lisle fell at Estang. Lisle had a long history of distinguished service. In 1339 and the early 1340s he had served in Gascony with Derby, and he had fought at Crécy in recognition of which he was appointed a founder member of the Order of the Garter. He had also been involved in the naval encounter at Winchelsea in 1350 and such service may well have contributed to his appointment as sheriff of Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire and governor of Cambridge castle.14 Military service often led to public duties in the shires and, increasingly, in the service of central government as well as in parliament amongst whose members were many old soldiers.

  The bureaucratisation of the English government meant that it became increasingly likely that one could forge a career and acquire patronage by rendering service in activities outside the military sphere. Nonetheless, military service remained one of the chief means of social and professional advancement. Hence, titles and promotions were granted regularly throughout the 1355 campaign. Richard Stafford was made a banneret at Bassoues on 19 October, and a number of new knights were dubbed including Tiderick van Dale and William Stratton, the prince’s tailor, on 12 November.

  After marching south for a hundred miles, the army swung east, crossed the River Gers, which marked Armagnac’s eastern border, and approached the count’s headquarters at Toulouse. At this stage in the expedition the larger towns tended to be avoided while those less well defended were pillaged and burned. This was not a siege train but a swiftly moving raid of devastation. The army forded the Garonne to the south and then, in a highly audacious move, the Ariège – an unthinkable idea to those who knew the area, and one which does not seem to have occurred to Armagnac who was confident that the Anglo-Gascons would not be able to penetrate into Languedoc beyond Toulouse. The manoeuvre did not tempt Armagnac into the field, however, and the army arrived at Carcassonne on 2 November. The city attempted to bribe the prince with 250,000 gold écus. He did not accept and burned the bourg (the outer town) in response. No attempt, however, was made to assault the heavily defended cité (the fortified, administrative centre). Narbonne, reached on 8 November, provided even less resistance, although the citadel similarly held out. News of the prince’s advance meant the main town was virtually uninhabited and undefended when the army arrived. Edward stayed in the Carmelite convent while his troops looted the rest of the town, albeit while suffering attack and bombardment from the cité. They army withdrew on 10 November, pursued by furious troops and townsmen.

  Two French armies began to converge on the prince at this point from Toulouse and Limoges led by Armagnac and Jacques de Bourbon respectively. The Marshal Clermont also brought troops from north of the Dordogne and further support was expected from Charles, the dauphin (the future Charles V) until he was diverted to Picardy. The prince marched north crossing the Aude at Aubian and when approached the French fell back. Armagnac’s policy mimicked that of Philip VI’s before the battle of Crécy, and with better reason because of it. He aimed therefore to defend principal river crossings, towns and fortified sites, and not to be forced into a confrontation. Prior to leaving Narbonne, the prince received letters from the pope who feared the intentions of an army not far from Avignon. The messengers were not received courteously and after a considerable wait were told to address their concerns to the king.

  The proximity of Armagnac and Bourbon coloured the next phase of the expedition, but the prince’s motivations remain uncertain. Was he seeking a battle or trying to avoid one? Edward rode in the direction of Béziers before turning east, perhaps in the face of French reinforcements, towards Armagnac. The prince certainly expected a battle even if he did not try to engineer one, but Armagnac maintained his strategy and withdrew. The prince followed him as far as Carcassonne and then headed towards the comparative safety of the lands of the count of Foix. 15 November marked an iconic moment in the raid and indeed the whole chevauchée strategy: Edward and his commanders spent the day at the Dominican house at Prouille, it being Sunday, while the rest of the army burned four towns in 12 hours.

  The prince met Gaston Fébus, count of Foix, on 17 November at Boulbonne and they reached an agreement: Gaston’s lands were to be spared any attack or disruption. While officially neutral, Gaston assisted the prince: ‘non seulement il assura son ravitaillement, mais encore il permit aux Béarnais de s’engager dans le corps expeditionnaire.’15 The difficult and treacherous route back to Gascony was perhaps taken in an attempt to deter Armagnac. Some fierce but limited skirmishing did take place but no full-scale encounter, and the army re-entered the duchy on 28 November reaching La Réole on 2 December.

  Armagnac’s failure to react to the prince’s army is peculiar considering the extent of the destruction and the possible prizes should he win a battle. Hewitt argued, ‘It is most probable that he had a secret understanding with the English’, but there seems to
be little evidence to support this view and far more to suggest that he was a loyal Valois subject. In any case, many commanders deliberately avoided pitched battle because of the possible consequences of defeat. Furthermore, the prince’s association with the count of Foix must have given him pause for thought, and Armagnac may have been greatly outnumbered – there is little evidence concerning the forces had at his disposal.16

  The raids of 1355–6, like that which preceded the encounter at Crécy, struck at the military and personal reputation of the French monarch and nobility, and seriously affected royal tax revenue. Like earlier raids, the grande chevauchée was deliberately destructive, extremely brutal and all the more effective since it was methodical and sophisticated. After the conclusion of the expedition, Sir John Wingfield, the prince’s business manager, wrote to the bishop of Winchester. His letter shows great concern with determining the exact value to the French crown of the areas assaulted in 1355 and thus the precise extent of the economic damage.17

  For the countryside and towns which have been destroyed in this raid produced more revenue for the king of France in aid of his wars than half his kingdom; … as I could prove from authentic documents found in various towns in the tax collectors’ houses.18