The Battle of Poitiers 1356 Page 3

  The 1355 expedition was an archetypal chevauchée and proved to be a remarkable tactical and logistical achievement. The prince marched from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean coast and back fighting only a few minor skirmishes and causing a vast amount of damage. French defensive preparations were generally ineffective and over 500 settlements were burned; it was ‘une catastrophe sans précedent.’19

  CHAPTER TWO:

  Winter–Spring 1355–6

  Defence and Preparation

  During the winter of 1355–6, the troops were billeted along the northern march. Warwick remained at La Réole, Salisbury went to Saint-Foy, and Suffolk to Saint-Emilion. The prince, with Chandos and Audley marched to Libourne. Three weeks passed before they undertook any further action.1

  From the beginning of the Hundred Years War the need for public and parliamentary support encouraged the development of a sophisticated propaganda campaign in England. This took a wide variety of forms and media from stained glass images, manuscript illuminations, public ceremonies, pageants and proclamations, to meetings of the Order of the Garter. As part of this campaign it became normal practice to send regular communications back from the front to England in order to inform the public of successes and request further resources. In some cases these included personal letters. The 1355–6 expedition was no different and such documents are extremely valuable and provide a great deal of information about the period between the grande chevauchée and the raid that would lead to a battlefield outside Poitiers.2

  Two letters were written at Bordeaux on 23 and 25 December 1355 by the prince and John Wingfield (governor of the prince’s business affairs) to William Edington, bishop of Winchester. Edington was the head of the prince’s council in England and communications sent initially to the prince’s officials were then circulated more widely throughout the country. Wingfield also wrote from his base at Libourne on 22 January, probably to Richard Stafford, who had travelled back to England bearing letters and with a commission to return with reinforcements and supplies. This communication related events which followed the first raid.3 Later, other letters were dispatched, three of which remain and recount the events of the second raid and the battle of Poitiers. A communication of 25 June 1356, sent to the bishop of Hereford, was brief and requested prayers and masses. On 20 October, Roger Cotesford, one of the prince’s bachelors, took another letter to the bishop of Worcester. The most important missive, carried by Nigel Loryng to the mayor, aldermen and commonality of London, was probably also intended for subsequent distribution outside the capital.4 Other members of the retinue who wrote home also passed information. Bartholomew Burghersh penned communications to John Beauchamp, and Henry Peverel corresponded with the prior of Winchester. The prince also wrote to the prior naming all those killed or captured at Poitiers. News was also passed by papal envoys, via wine merchants, and by the sub-admirals Deyncourt and Hoggeshawe who returned with some of the ships which had taken the army to Gascony.5 Requests for prayers continued to be made regularly. The Friars Preachers, Friars Minor, Carmelites, Austin friars, and the bishop of London were contacted in this regard.

  In its propaganda programme the crown relied heavily on the services of the church and the parochial system became the chief conduit for the distribution of news through sermons and prayers made for the success of English armies in France. Both English and French judged they fought a ‘just war’ according to Augustinian principles. This not only ‘justified’ the shedding of blood but also emphasised triumph in battle as an indication of divine approbation. Prior to his departure in 1355 the prince visited Westminster to pray for success in the forthcoming expedition, and on his return to England after Poitiers, the prince gave thanks at Canterbury for his victory.

  During the winter and spring of 1355–6 the prince busied himself with various administrative and governmental matters as well as the forthcoming campaign. In his capacity as the king’s lieutenant he dealt with affairs such as an appeal of the people of Bayonne against the count of Albret, and favourable diplomatic relations had to be maintained with the count of Foix.6

  While the prince focused on the affairs of the duchy, Sir Richard Stafford returned to England and Wales with a commission to bring reinforcements and supplies. The exact details of his mission are uncertain, but he brought over 300 Cheshire archers into service. Larger numbers may have been requested but the duke of Lancaster was also recruiting troops at this time which restricted the availability of manpower. Recruitment elsewhere probably brought another 300 archers. Military summons were also sent to the seneschal of north Wales, and in addition to those troops from the prince’s demesne, the expedition attracted men from Westmoreland, Yorkshire and as far afield as Germany.7

  In Gascony defence was the first priority – both internal and external. The frontiers of the duchy were extended. Support was secured from a number of Gascon nobles who had not participated in the earlier campaign including Jean de Galard, Bertrand de Durfort, and the lords of Caumont and Chalais. Deployed at key locations along the frontier a number of important figures in the military retinue undertook a series of small-scale raids to keep Armagnac and the French on the defensive. By this means counter-measures were put in place to prevent French attacks, the Anglo-Gascon ‘Pale’ was enlarged, and the soldiery were kept usefully employed. Despite this, however, the French retook over 30 towns and castles.8 Defence of the extended Gascon frontier had been and remained a major problem for English authorities and it grew considerably after 1362 with the creation of the much larger principality of Aquitaine.

  This period of relative inactivity also saw a change in the moral dynamic of the expedition. When the army had ridden through Languedoc it had been at liberty to burn and destroy. Now it occupied ‘not only the physical borderland between English and French territory, but also the moral and legal borderland between the warrior and the armed criminal.’ A much more careful distinction now had to be made between non-combatants in English (Gascon) and French territory, those who had the right to protection, and those who might be attacked legitimately.9

  Broadly speaking the policy in the winter and spring of 1355–6 was to harass the enemy while waiting for reinforcements, or until a diversionary English invasion was launched elsewhere. The raids began around Christmas. Burghersh was stationed in Saintonge where the frontier probably lay along the River Charente from Rochefort (threatening La Rochelle) to Taillebourg and as far as Cognac. From there he raided northward into Poitou. The captal de Buch was particularly successful in raids on the same area. He recaptured a number of castles in the east of Saintonge, then invaded Poitou in January before turning south toward Périgeux which he captured and handed over to the lord of Mussidan. In the Dordogne, operational headquarters were established at Libourne with reserves at St Emilion. The earls of Oxford, Salisbury, and Suffolk with Elie de Pommiers and the lord of Mussidan, in command of about 1,000 men raided across the river valley towards Rocamadour. They took Souillac and Beaulieu-sur-Dordogne.

  The Garonne formed another boundary, although the French maintained some garrisons west of the river. Warwick’s raiding party, including Chandos and Audley, probably crossed somewhere near Port Sainte Marie, which they captured in January 1356. The earl then swung northwards along the right hand bank of the river. He took Clairac and then Tonneins. By the time Wingfield sent his letters Warwick had reached Marmande, and a detachment under Chandos and Audley launched raids into the Agenais, capturing Castelsagrat.

  Meanwhile Baldwin Botetourt (master of the prince’s great horses) was based at Brassac. The first six weeks of 1356 proved scarcely less damaging to French royal interests in the south than the grande chevauchée itself. English territorial gains while modest were significant as they were concentrated on the north-west frontier of the duchy and so ensured the support of allies among the Gascon nobility. The role of the Gascon aristocracy should not be underestimated. Durfort, for example, controlled some 30 walled towns, Caumont a further six, and both Ga
lard and Albret were major landholders. ‘They were the weather-vanes of the south-west’,10 their allegiance was vital to the political integrity of the duchy, and their defection in 1368–9 would destroy the principality.

  CHAPTER THREE:

  The Campaign of 1356

  The success of the first raid, the arrival of new Gascon allies, and the despatch of English reinforcements ensured a second expedition. In addition to those recruited by Stafford, further reinforcement led by some distinguished figures sailed from England. On 28 March 1356, letters of protection were made out for Edward Despenser (Lord Despenser from 1357), William 3rd lord Morley, Edward Courtenay (the prince’s bachelor and a close relative of the earl of Devon), and 119 others going to join the retinues of the prince and his captains. With a greater army the prince also received greater political authority: on 12 January Edward III granted him the power to undertake peace negotiations with the French. The 1356 raid was once again part of a wider strategic programme involving Lancaster with the intention that the expeditionary forces should join together at some stage. In retrospect, problems of communication and the pressure created by the French forces meant that if such co-ordination was achieved it would be more by luck than judgement. Lancaster invaded Normandy in June and was joined by Robert Knolles, Jean de Montfort, Philip of Navarre and Godfrey de Harcourt. They departed on 22 June, re-supplied the Navarrese strongholds of Pont-Audemar and Breteuil, and diverted French attention from the south. On 8 August, Lancaster was commissioned to begin a campaign in Penthièvre, continuing the diversionary tactics.1

  Before setting out the prince declared he wished to fight the count of Poitiers, the king’s new lieutenant in Languedoc. The count was believed to be at Bourges and had been gathering troops since mid May. Further reinforcements assembled there in June and July led by Jean de Clermont, Jean le Maingre, the seneschals of Poitou, Saintonge and Toulouse, and the royal secretary, Pierre de Labatut.2 Meanwhile the prince made preparations for the defence of Gascony. This was an acute concern since he had had received intelligence indicating Armagnac was likely to attack after the departure of the expeditionary force. John Chivereston, the seneschal of the duchy, Bernard d’Albret, and Thomas Roos, mayor of Bordeaux, remained behind in command of the defence.

  The prince left his operational headquarters at Bergerac in early August with an army probably no larger than he had led in 1355. Despite Stafford’s efforts and the other reinforcements, this was not as large a force as he had wished. Some had deserted from the army, and some of those recruited had not arrived in Gascony. Orders were sent to the lieutenant-justice of Cheshire regarding 43 deserters, although some received a formal leave of absence such as William Jodrell who was granted the famous Jodrell deed. His brother, John, fought at Poitiers as part of a company of bowmen raised from among the burgesses and inhabitants of Llantrisant.3

  The army now marched north along the east of the Massif Central through Périgord, the Limousin and Poitou. [See Map 3] The second raid was not characterised, at least by the chroniclers, as being as destructive as that of 1355, but this is not to say that the Agenais, the Limousin and La Marche escaped without harm. After crossing the River Vienne some inconclusive skirmishing took place outside Bourges, which, although the count of Poitiers proved not to be resident, had been heavily fortified. Unsurprisingly, the prince’s army attracted attention almost immediately.

  Since 12 July, King Jean II had been laying siege to the castle of Breteuil, a Navaresse stronghold in eastern Normandy. It was well-supplied and vigorously defended and the French royal army had made little headway. Jean’s situation was precarious: the costs of French military action were becoming crippling, and news that yet another English army was being prepared resulted in a drastic devaluation of the value of the coinage. Meanwhile the expense of the siege of Breteuil showed little sign of ending to his satisfaction. Consequently, when Jean learned the prince’s army had left Gascony he paid the Navaresse an enormous sum to abandon the castle with the promise of free passage to rejoin Philippe of Navarre in the Contentin. The king’s troops were needed urgently in the south to save his land and his political reputation. French royal forces were redeployed at Chartres: realising he had to counter the mobility of the Anglo-Gascon army Jean left much of his infantry behind. Although joined at Chartres by William Douglas leading troops from Scotland, the king’s calls for assistance from the French nobility were not answered with enthusiasm.

  Certain advances had been made regarding matters of recruitment and military strategy but the French army had not reached the same degree of professionalism as its English counterpart. Nonetheless, the dreadful experience at Crécy had brought a number of changes. In particular, by c.1350 the traditional feudal array no longer provided the bulk of infantry troops and verbal or written contracts were becoming common. Jean II, however, still made extensive use of the ban and the arrière-ban – the call for military service for mounted troops. These different forms of recruitment provided the French king with a substantial army although not as large as that which Philippe VI brought to Crécy.4

  Meanwhile the prince’s army headed for the French interior. Edward spent the night of 28 August at Vierzon – he burned it the next day. Scouting parties began to make contact with French forces, and Chandos and Audley encountered a French detachment led by Philip de Chambly who had been dispatched by Jean II to delay the prince and allow the king time to bring his own forces into play. By the end of August the prince had learned Jean’s army was at Orléans and had not yet joined the forces of the count of Poitiers. The Anglo-Gascon army advanced along the valley of the River Cher to the town of Romorantin, which capitulated on 30 August. The castle, commanded by Marshal Boucicaut and Amaury, sire de Craon, held out for another three days. Bouciault had, at some cost, fulfilled his mission to obstruct and delay the prince. The siege of Romorantin gave the French royal army an opportunity to eat into the Anglo-Gascon lead. In 1355 the prince had not delayed to capture well-fortified towns. This policy changed somewhat in 1356 and it may be that he was deliberately trying to provoke a French attack.5

  The raiders marched westwards towards Tours down the north bank of the Cher but were unable to cross the Loire near Amboise, thereby precluding any meeting with Lancaster. The French had broken every bridge between Tours and Blois. The prince certainly hoped for support and wrote he was ‘intending to meet our dear cousin [Lancaster]…of whom we heard for certain that he was trying to march towards us.’6 Conditions began to look grim. The Anglo-Gascon expedition lacked supplies and became ever more aware of the approaching French army. The prince was forced to rest for four days near Tours after a march of 320 miles in 32 days. The French royal army had moved more swiftly still, but at the cost of becoming disjointed – the various units were separated over a considerable distance.

  On or around 10 September, Jean finally joined forces with the Count of Poitiers and crossed the River Loire at Blois. Together they marched towards Amboise, now only some ten miles from the prince’s army. The threat was now very real since an additional force commanded by Clermont was also in the vicinity – it had been sent to defend Touraine. Edward withdrew over the rivers Cher and Indre. On Monday 12 September, the likelihood of a battle grew further and the papacy took a hand to try and prevent bloodshed. Cardinal Talleyrand de Périgord attempted to broker a truce between Jean and the prince but failed. These negotiations further slowed the progress of the army. After reaching Montbazan on 18 September, the prince’s scouts found the French army outside Poitiers. Cardinal Talleyrand attempted to make peace once again and given his precarious position it is not surprising the prince appeared willing to make a number of concessions. These were not paltry; they included the forfeiture of all property and prisoners that had been gained in the campaign and an oath not to take up arms against the king of France for seven years. This willingness to negotiate may have been conditioned by a fear of being trapped and starved into submission rather than engaging the enemy.
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  The 18th happened to be a Sunday and the Cardinal argued that a truce should be observed at least until sunrise of the following day. This delay meant that the French had time to bring in reinforcements and the English could entrench their position and build defensive screens for the archers. Further discussions took place. The French negotiators included Geoffrey de Charny and the archbishop of Sens, while Warwick, Suffolk, Burghersh, Chandos and Audley represented the English. There was little room for negotiation, however, since the French insisted on total surrender. An equally unlikely, but suitably chivalric suggestion was a duel between a hundred troops from both sides – this was also rejected.

  Consequently, the battle lines were drawn on broken ground on the plains of Maupertuis,7 some eight kilometres south-east of Poitiers, to the north and the west of Nouaillé forest, on an incline near the River Miosson.

  CHAPTER FOUR:

  The Battle of Poitiers

  On the morning of the battle (19 September), the sun rose a little before six o’clock, the day promised to be warm and clear. Cardinal Talleyrand made a final fruitless visit to the English camp in the hope of preventing a confrontation. Once more, the prince appears to have been willing to seek a compromise but his terms were again rejected by King Jean. After Talleyrand departed and made for Poitiers it was clear that a battle could not be avoided.

  The assault does not appear to have been launched immediately as there was time for a discussion in the French ranks concerning the best plan of attack. One reason for this may have been the growing strength of the Anglo-Gascon defensive position. According to the author of the Chronique des règnes de Jean II et Charles V this certainly proved the main reason for the eventual failure of the French assault.1